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Science - The Endless Frontier: 
A Half Century Later 
by Murray Weidenbaum 
Viewed from the perspective of half a century later, Vannevar Bush's landmark report, 
Science - The Endless Frontier, 1 was a pathbreaking effort which established the basic trend 
and orientation of federal science policy and activity for the following half century. Neverthe-
less, the Bush report also, and in some crucial ways, turned out to be irrelevant or counterpro-
ductive in terms of subsequent federal policy on research and development. These ambivalent 
conclusions arise from several key points which are developed in this paper. 
The Fundamental Contributions of the Bush Report 
It is difficult for most people to recall now the policy environment of 1945 for which 
Vannevar Bush's report was prepared. Although World War IT was still raging, some farsighted 
folks began the important task of post-war planning. There was no science policy established for 
the federal government, nor had there been any special desire to do so. Of course, the advent of 
the atomic bomb dramatically convinced the public, as well as government officials, of the 
awesome power of science and technology. In less dramatic ways, scientists and engineers had 
made other vital contributions to the war effort, ranging from radar to code-breaking. 
Nevertheless, in the entire prewar period, the history of federal support of science had 
been, in the main, incidental. Although significant government outlays were made for specific 
projects, no federal agency had been established to promote or support science or technology 
generally. Rather, the assistance that was provided was through a specialized agency devoted 
primarily to another function. The government's investment in technology thus was ancillary to 
the promotion of some other public purpose. 
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The Department of Agriculture, for example, maintained an extensive research program 
designed to assist farmers in the production and marketing of their crops. The Department of 
Commerce contained the Coast and Geodetic Survey and a modest-size National Bureau of 
Standards, to provide the data on weights and measures needed by the commercial and industrial 
economy. The Department of the Interior supported the Geological Survey and the Navy 
Department operated the Naval Observatory. A small National Advisory Committee for Aero-
nautics was the forerunner of today's huge National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
Even the Office of Scientific Research and Development, which Dr. Bush headed during World 
War II, was set up to develop and funnel scientific knowledge into the war effort. 
Thus, the fundamental contribution of the report was something that we tend to take for 
granted these days - to convince key decisionmakers that the federal government should take on 
a major new responsibility for expanding scientific knowledge to benefit society in important 
ways, both military and civilian. In retrospect, it is conceivable that a different approach could 
have been taken. It could have been decided (by action or inaction) that it was up to the decen-
tralized educational systems and business enterprises to determine the extent of the scientific 
activity that they would fmance and conduct. The chances are that this alternate approach 
would have yielded a smaller overall commitment of resources to science and technology over 
the past 50 years, with the private sector taking on a major portion, but not all, of the public 
sector's funding role. 
Two specific organizational changes to implement the new policy orientation also flowed 
from the Bush report - the establishment of the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the 
creation of a scientific advisory apparatus for the federal government. Bush envisioned ambi-
tious roles for both the foundation and the advisory board, which he urged be attached to the 
foundation. The NSF was viewed as the proper place to house all of the federal government's 
basic research efforts, a proposal never fully adopted by the Congress. The advisory board 
concept has had a checkered career. Technically, the NSF - which is alive and well - has a 
prestigious board to provide counsel to the director of the agency. 
However, it is at the White House level that scientific advisers influence national policy. 
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For many years until its demise, the President's Scientific Advisory Committee was a prestigious 
group that had important inputs on key defense and civilian issues. In more recent years, a full-
time White House science adviser with a small staff has attempted to fill that gap. 
Finally, words do have impact. The choice of the title of the Bush report, Science - The 
Endless Frontier, turns out to have been most fortuitous. It conveyed the vision of a continuing 
and ambitious effort. 
The Gap Between Policy Recommendation 
and Policy Execution 
As might be expected, a substantial gap has arisen between the policies recommended in 
the Bush report - even when the attempt was made to carry them out - and the actual execu-
tion of those policies. 
In practice, the responsibility for promotion of science and technology is far more frag-
mented than envisioned by Vannevar Bush. The federal government has taken the lead position, 
given the magriitude of the resources that it can command and the scope of legislative and 
executive authority it possesses. Nevertheless, individual universities, research institutes, and 
companies exercise considerable discretion over the allocation of their own funds for science 
and new technology. In a society like ours characterized by a very substantial decentralization 
of decisionmaking, such competition may be especially beneficial. In any event, the Bush report 
has convinced us all that the promotion of science is an important and relatively high priority 
function worthy of considerable support in the public and the private sectors. 
Similarly, the organizational responses to the specific proposals of the Bush report fall a bit 
short of Vannevar Bush's original vision, but the results may be described, perhaps somewhat 
generously, as a variation on his theme. The Bush report recommended the establishment of a 
National Research Foundation, an agency like the present NSF supervised by a high-powered 
Scientific Advisory Board, with broad authority over the nation's overall science policy. The 
NSF has become a significant source of fmancing academic research with an annual budget of 
about $2.1 billion. Contrary to Bush's expectations, however, several centers of significant 
scientific research operate outside the purview of the NSF. Neither the Office of Naval Re-
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search and the other military agencies nor the forerunners of the National Institutes of Health 
have turned over to the Foundation their extensive programs of basic research. In the fiscal year 
1995, the NSF accounted for less than 16 percent of the federal government's total outlays for 
basic research of $13.5 billion. 
Nevertheless, Vannevar Bush's general idea of a prestigious body to recommend areas of 
research emphasis continues to draw support. That is a key conclusion of the Committee on 
Criteria for Federal Support of Research and Development. 2 However, such a centrally located 
group would need to possess a demanding set of characteristics - competence, independence, 
and effectiveness. As my colleague Richard J. Mahoney has noted, the prospects for meeting 
these three criteria are "vanishingly small." 
To tum an old phrase, the Congress giveth and the Congress taketh away (or vice versa). 
In rejecting his central proposal, the Congress gave Bush more than he wanted in terms of 
specifics. Contrary to his preferences, Congress authorized the NSF to support applied research 
and the social sciences, in addition to its primary focus on basic research in the natural sciences. 
Today, neither the NSF nor its outside advisory board is an important player in the devel-
opment or oversight of national, or even federal, science or research and development (R&D) 
policy. The key issues remain the province of the White House and/or the individual depart-
ments (Defense, Commerce, E~ergy, Health and Human Services, NASA, etc.). Specifically, 
the Bush report did not effectively respond to President Roosevelt's charge to recommend how 
to organize a program for continuing "the work . . . done in medicine." The Bush report 
envisioned a modest-size Division of Medical Research in the NSF, with a budget of $20 million 
in its fifth year of operation. The generously funded National Institutes of Health in the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services have more than fllled that gap. 
For a while (especially in the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations), a presidentially 
appointed scientific advisory board operated independently from the NSF. That board did play 
a significant role in the review of important national issues (national security, etc.) with large 
scientific aspects. Subsequently, the role has been assigned to a single full-time scientific 
adviser with a modest-sized staff. The process of selecting the science adviser and the opera-
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tion of that office often has encountered substantial criticism for their political nature. In any 
event, the status of that function seems to have been downgraded substantially in recent years. 
Basic Shortcomings of the Bush Report 
Acknowledging the important contributions of Science - The Endless Frontier should not 
prevent us from pointing out some of the shortcomings of that pioneering effort. Two of those 
limitations are especially worthy of our attention. 
1) The Bush report focused on basic science and university-trained scientific manpower, 
while ignoring or downplaying applied research and development. In the following half century, 
by contrast, the emphasis in public policy has been on the entire category of R&D, which is a 
much broader concept. In terms of resources used, R&D is dominated by large engineering 
projects and other applied efforts. In the year 1994, for example, the United States devoted 
$100 billion to development and $72 billion to research (divided between $31 billion for basic 
research and $41 billion for applied research). At the federal level alone, $42 billion was 
devoted to development in fiscal year 1995 and $27 billion to research (almost equally divided 
between basic and applied). 3 (See Tables 1-3 for detailed data.) Conceptually, the interaction 
between research and development can occur in both directions. As Bush notes, scientific 
advances are the basic seeds of development. However, technological advances also provide 
apparatus to understand physical phenomena better. In practice, the ties between scientific work 
and. technology have been close. 4 
It should be noted, however, that a distinguished committee of the National Academies 
of Science and Engineering and the Institute of Medicine has urged that attention of government 
policymakers should be focused on a narrower category that they call federal science and 
technology. That Committee on Criteria for Federal Support of Research and Development 
noted that only $35-40 billion a year of federal money is spent on advancing scientific knowl-
edge and new technology. The remainder of federal R&D funds, in its view, is devoted to such 
activities as establishing production lines and developing operational systems for new aircraft, 
space vehicles, and weapon systems.' 
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As for the development of scientific and engineering manpower, which Bush saw as a 
key federal task, overwhelmingly that has been the task of the decentralized system of public and 
private colleges and universities. At the graduate level, much of the educational effort has been 
subsidized indirectly by the award of governmental R&D contracts to institutions and faculty. 
Direct federal financing of science education has been relatively modest and certainly not the 
pacing element. In any event, the direction of scientific and technical education in the United 
States has remained the responsibility of the individual school, college, and university. The key 
forces influencing that direction have been the peer group evaluations - formal and informal -
within academia itself. 
A major external force influencing enrollment in engineering degree programs has been 
the large fluctuations in the labor market for scientific and technological manpower. The 
strategic influence here has been waves of initiations (and terminations) of substantive govern-
ment programs, notably large weapon systems, NASA projects, and nuclear development. 
2) The Bush report placed most of its attention on the role of the federal government and 
gave the private sector short shrift. Apparently Vannevar Bush did not foresee the massive sums 
that the federal government would be supplying to industry in the form of R&D contracts, 
especially in the 1960s and 1970s- and a substantial $24 billion as recently as 1994. 
Of far greater importance, the majority of R&D is now sponsored, fmanced, and per-
formed by the private sector. In fact, R&D has been performed by business firms since the 
1940s, so no significant change has occurred in this regard. In 1994, private industry per-
formed $124 billion out of the entire $172 billion of R&D in the nation. An important shift has 
taken place in the last decade and a half in terms of determining the direction of R&D. Since 
1981, business has replaced the federal government as the major source of fmancing and spon-
sorship of R&D. The private share has been rising steadily - from a minority 35 percent in 
1960 to a dominant 64 percent in 1994 (see Figure 1). 
The Bush report dismissed the role of the private sector with a very academically oriented 
statement, "The simplest and most effective way in which the Government can strengthen 
industrial research is to support basic research and to develop scientific talent." In the light of 
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current experience, that is a very naive and, if a professor may say so, a very academic view-
point. The Bush model clearly assumes that basic research, presumably performed in university 
laboratories, is always the pacing element and that private industry stands around waiting to feed 
on the morsels thrown to it. Of course, Bush recognized in the body of his report that large 
industrial laboratories did exist. 
While the relationships described in the Bush report surely continue, other models can be 
observed. On occasion, companies already well established in high-tech industries set up 
laboratories with wide-ranging agendas. The Bell Labs were the most distinguished examples of 
that phenomenon. 
Moreover, the ability to commercialize the fruits of scientific research often has been 
deterred by a variety of governmental tax and regulatory policies, by and large a subject ignored 
by Vannevar Bush. At times the major barriers to the development of a large biotechnology 
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industry in the United States have been the difficulties in obtaining the various approvals re-
quired from federal (and state) rulemaking agencies, rather than the limits in the availability of 
funding. 
A 1996 survey of regulatory barriers to innovation in the United States revealed numer-
ous other examples, including the following gems: 
1. The extended nature of the Federal Aviation Administration certification process is a 
significant constraint on the introduction of new general aviation technology into commercial 
aircraft. 
2. The Clean Air Act's rigid permit process locks companies into current manufactur-
ing processes for five years, a serious impediment to new product development. 
3. Differences in regulatory regimes among states are becoming greater than those 
among nations. An example is the new mandate in California that 2 percent of the vehicles sold 
in the state emit no pollutants. 
4. The continued application of export controls on supercomputers, long after these 
controls were no longer viable, is a significant regulatory barrier. This barrier encouraged India 
to develop its own capabilities rather than purchase supercomputers from the United States.6 
On other occasions, changes in the tax laws have raised or lowered the threshold for 
making a profitable investment in a new technology or in the new production process or product 
that results. Unfortunately, all this describes a very different world from 1945, a world that has 
developed since the Bush report was written. His recommendations in this regard (and they 
were a very minor part of the report), were to "remove present uncertainties" regarding the tax 
deductibility of R&D and to remove "certain abuses" in the patent system. On the latter point, 
Bush deferred entirely to the Commerce Department, which he expected would subsequently 
make specific suggestions. 
In the tax area, by contrast, today there is widespread recognition of the need to reform the 
government's revenue structure to encourage the saving and investment needed to commercialize 
the new technology resulting from scientific advances. 7 Likewise, regulatory concerns are far 
broader than merely improving the patent system, helpful as that might be. 
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The limited policy responses to regulatory problems contained in the Bush report are at 
special variance with the current needs of high-tech industries. For example, when the members 
of the National Infonnation Infrastructure (NII) were recently asked to identify the most impor-
tant federal role in facilitating the NII (commonly referred to as the Infonnation Superhighway), 
only 14 percent of these high-powered computer and component suppliers cited funding for 
R&D and 10 percent funding for applications and infrastructure development. In striking 
contrast, 43 percent said that repealing or refonning outmoded laws, rules, and regulations 
would be most helpful. 8 
When a similar question was asked about the role of state and local governments, compa-
rable responses were received: only 12 percent identified funding for applications and infra-
structure development, while 50 percent advocated repealing or refonning outmoded laws, rules, 
and regulations. Perhaps some of the limited interest in federal funding for R&D reflects the 
disenchantment over the increased politicization of the allocation process. The extended use of 
"eannarking" funds for specific projects in the districts of powerful members of Congress sends 
a very negative message about the lack of professionalism in the entire process. 
On the positive side, government can play an important role in promoting science and 
technology - and with a minimum of expenditure or intervention in private decisionmaking. It 
is by creating an economic environment more conducive to the utilization of the fruits of re-
search and development by eliminating or at least reducing the numerous obstacles to innovation 
that government itself has erected over the years. After all, it is futile for the federal govern-
ment to pay vast sums into high-tech enterprises if, at the same time, it continues to erect 
statutory and administrative roadblocks to the application of those new technologies. 
Because many federal agencies exempt existing facilities, products, and processes from 
their regulations (so-called grandfather clauses), the main burden of expanding regulation falls 
on new enterprises, new undertakings, and new technology. On the other hand, past experience 
with the U.S. government trying to force technological innovation is quite discouraging. The $3 
billion the government wasted in the abortive effort to develop a commercial synthetic fuels 
industry is a striking case in point. An economic assessment of the efforts by Linda Cohen and 
Roger Noll is devastating: 
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The entire synfuels program had a quality of madness to it. Project after project failed. . . . 
Goals were unattainable from the start. Official cost-benefit studies estimated net benefits 
in the minus billions of dollars. 9 
But synfuels was not an isolated example. Similar failures occurred in the aborted super-
sonic transport project and in the Clinch River breeder reactor. The financially hemorrhaging 
superconducting super collider was terminated more recently. 10 
The specific decisionmaking processes that government has used to make these allocations 
of federal resources to technology have varied over time. But the substantive characteristics 
seem rather durable. Government favors politically powerful firms, which usually means the 
older and more labor-intensive companies. Over the years, these firms have invested substantial 
resources in improving their presence in the government's decisionmaking processes in Wash-
ington. Moreover, they are the "squeaky wheels," suffering the most from competitive forces. 
New and growing firms- especially in the high-tech area- may be economically strong, 
but they usually are politically weak. They have neither an extended record of fmancial contri-
butions to political candidates nor sufficient knowledge of lobbying techniques nor large groups 
of agitated employees/voters. Moreover, they are too busy designing, producing, and marketing 
new products to devote much of their time, energy, and resources to politicizing. 
Conclusions 
Despite its various specific shortcomings, Vannevar Bush's report must continue to get very 
high marks for its strategic value in developing widespread public and governmental interest in 
and support of promoting science - as well as new technology. In its fundamentals, the report 
surely has been a great success. The timing of the report, July 1945- one month before the 
end of World War II - was lucky at the least. 
Looking back over the past half century, the Bush report strongly influenced congressional 
action to establish the National Science Foundation specifically and to be generous in financing 
R&D generally. In light of the large federal government expenditures for scientific research, we 
tend to forget that - with the exception of agriculture - this phenomenon did not exist prior to 
World War II. The notion that the health of the economy as well as the strength of the national 
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Figure 2 
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security require new scientific knowledge has been validated repeatedly in the half century since 
Bush's report. Figure 2 shows the striking positive relationship between the level of technology 
used in an industry and its ability to create new jobs - and thus to contribute to economic 
progress. 
In a less dramatic but perhaps equally strategic way, the high-tech industries have been the 
key growth areas of the American economy, generating a large share of the "good" jobs for the 
American work force. Our foreign trade in high-tech products - unlike the rest of the economy 
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Figure 3 
U.S. Trade in Advanced Technology Products 
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-has produced trade surpluses year after year (see Figure 3). 
Nevertheless, the role of government today in the promotion of science and technology is 
reminiscent of the incompetent motorist with one foot on the gas pedal and the other on the 
brake. Whether by design or default, government continues to place all sorts of tax and regula-
tory obstacles in the way of successful commercialization of the results of R&D. In doing so, it 
also - indirectly but powerfully - discourages potential private-sector sponsors and supporters 
of science and technology. 
There are also new and compelling reasons to remedy the shortness of vision of science 
policy planners with reference to the private sector. Two key forces are reducing the federal role 
or at least the amount of money that the federal government is willing to spend for R&D - the 
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end of the Cold War and the effort to eliminate the budget deficit. Yet, a third factor - the 
increasing competitiveness of the global marketplace - puts special pressure on American 
industry to emphasize new technology to enhance its productivity. As noted earlier, it is in the 
high-tech products and processes that the United States enjoys a substantial comparative advan-
tage, and large surpluses of exports over imports. 
The contrast between the public sector's attitude toward science and technology and that of 
the private sector is striking. Private industry faces an enlarged need for the fruits of R&D 
precisely at a time when the largest single source of federal funding in this area - and federal 
funding generally - is being squeezed. 
Perhaps Dr. Bush was so caught up in the selfless patriotism that contributed so substan-
tially to the successful prosecution of World War II that he ignored the often vital roles of 
politics and governmental bureaucracy in public policy decisionmaking. A fundamental rethink-
ing of the place of science and technology in public policy seems in order. In the words of the 
Council on Competitiveness: "The U.S. R&D establishment has now entered a pivotal phase of 
transition . . . " 11 That transition is likely to be most successful if government takes on a more 
modest but still vital role - by shifting from being the prime fmancier and sponsor of R&D to 
that of creating the political and economic environment in which the private sector will be 
encouraged to take on that strategic task. 
Even when giving full weight to its shortcomings and considering the ideas from the 
convenient vantage point of a half century later, we must readily acknowledge the positive 
contributions of Vannevar Bush's unique effort. Surely, for a product of less than eight months 
from start to fmish, Science - The Endless Frontier set a standard for the effective completion 
of a successful government project that has rarely if ever been equaled. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Sources of R&D Funding in the United Sates 
(in billions of constant 1987 dollars) 
Federal Private Colleges, 
Year Government Industry Universities Other Total 
1970 42.6 29.7 1.3 1.0 74.6 
1975 37.4 32.2 1.6 1.1 72.2 
1980 41.4 43.1 1.9 1.3 87.7 
1985 55.2 61.4 2.5 1.4 120.5 
1987 57.9 62.6 3.2 1.6 125.3 
1988 57.4 65.5 3.3 1.8 128.0 
1989 55.3 69.2 3.6 2.0 130.1 
1990 54.6 73.6 3.9 2.1 134.2 
1991 51.4 78.7 4.1 2.2 136.4 
1992 50.0 81.6 4.2 2.3 138.1 
1993 49.8 81.1 4.2 2.3 137.4 
1994 49.5 80.9 4.2 2.4 137.0 
Source: U.S. National Science Foundation, National Patterns of R&D Resources (various issues). 
Year 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Source: 
Federal 
Government 
11.8 
11.2 
10.8 
13.7 
13.4 
13.8 
14.0 
14.3 
13.0 
13.1 
13.4 
13.7 
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Table A2 
Performers of R&D in the United States 
(in billions of constant 1987 dollars) 
Private Colleges, University 
Industry Universities Federal Centers 
51.3 6.8 2.1 
49.2 7.2 2.1 
62.1 8.6 3.2 
89.2 10.3 3.7 
92.1 12.2 4.2 
93.3 13.0 4.4 
94.1 13.8 4.4 
96.9 14.6 4.3 
99.4 15.1 4.4 
100.3 15.6 4.4 
98.7 16.2 4.3 
98.2 16.3 4.1 
Other Total 
2.6 74.6 
2.5 72.2 
3.0 87.7 
3.6 120.5 
3.4 125.3 
3.5 128.0 
3.8 130.1 
4.1 134.2 
4.5 136.4 
4.7 138.1 
4.8 137.4 
4.7 137.0 
U.S. National Science Foundation, National Patterns of R&D Resources (various issues). 
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Table A3 
R&D in the United States, by Category 
(percentage distribution) 
Basic Applied 
Year Research Research Development Total 
1980 14.1 18.5 67.4 100.0 
1985 14.0 13.1 72.9 100.0 
1989 14.9 23.9 61.2 100.0 
1990 14.6 24.3 61.1 100.0 
1991 17.0 25.6 57.4 100.0 
1992 17.2 26.0 56.8 100.0 
1993 17.4 26.9 55.7 100.0 
1994 17.3 27.1 55.6 100.0 
Source: U.S. National Science Foundation, National Patterns of R&D Resources (various issues). 
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